委托代理模型的扩展  

An Extension to the Principal-Agent Model

作　　者：刘玉勋[1] 单禹[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东肇庆学院经济与管理学院,广东肇庆526061 [2]中央财经大学中国金融发展研究院,北京100081

出　　处：《肇庆学院学报》2011年第6期28-32,共5页Journal of Zhaoqing University

基　　金：广东省自然科学基金项目(8152606101000010);广东省普通高校人文社会科学"十一五"规划项目(06ZD79002)

摘　　要：针对传统的委托代理模型不能解释股东是如何选择经理人的缺陷,对传统的委托代理模型进行扩展:提出代理人目标的多层次性,以此来解释只获得保留效用的代理人签约的动力来源;提出委托人的保留剩余约束,以此来反映委托人的参与约束;提出合作剩余概念,以此来反映形成委托代理关系的前提条件。运用扩展的委托代理模型可以发现,委托代理关系的形成本质上是合作剩余的分配过程,而不同的市场结构是影响合作剩余分配的主要因素。In view of the flaw that the traditional Principal-Agent model fails to explain how the share-holders choose their managers, the paper carries on an extension to the traditional principal-agent model and proposes the multi-level of agent goal so as to explain the power source of the agent signing only for reservation utility ; The paper also puts forward the principal＇s reservation residue constraint to reflect the principal participation constraint ; The cooperative residue concept is proposed to reflect the formation of the prerequisites for the principal-agent relationship. By using the exension to the principal-agent model, it is discovered that the formation of the principal-agent relationship is essentially the assignment process of cooperative residue, and that different market mechanism is the primary factor which affects the cooperative residue assignment.

关 键 词：期望效用 期望报酬 保留效用 保留报酬 保留剩余 合作剩余 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]