双边道德风险情况下考虑客户知识依赖的服务合作生产契约  

Service co-production contracting with client knowledge dependence in double moral hazard

作　　者：李慧芬[1] 杨德礼[1] 祈瑞华[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《科技与管理》2011年第6期51-55,共5页Science-Technology and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70890080;70890083)

摘　　要：企业间知识密集型服务合作生产由于存在相互知识依赖,导致双方的粘性信息不能被无成本证实和监督,从而产生双边道德风险。基于客户合作视角,建立委托代理模型,从固定支付和剩余激励支付两方面分析了双边道德风险情况下客户知识依赖对服务合作生产契约设计的影响。结论表明,契约的剩余激励支付与客户知识依赖弹性系数负相关,契约的固定支付与客户知识依赖弹性系数正相关。The co-production and delivery process of knowledge-intensive services across client and provider organizations has costly information stickness because of their knowledge interdependence,and it would result in double moral hazard.From a collaboration perspective,we develop models to discuss the implications for service co-production contract design by client knowledge engagement from both fixed payment and residual incentive.We find that the residual incentive payment is negatively related with the output elasticity of client effort and the fixed part is positively related with the elasticity parameter.

关 键 词：知识依赖 服务合作生产 双边道德风险 委托代理模型 契约设计 

分 类 号：F276.42[经济管理—企业管理]