低碳时代基于节能减排的博弈均衡分析  

The Analysis of the Game Equilibrium on Energy Saving and Emission Reductions Towards the Low Carbon Economy

作　　者：聂力[1] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学统计学院,北京100070

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2011年第12期13-16,共4页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

摘　　要：节能减排作为我国发展低碳经济的一项主要举措在实施推广中存在诸多挑战。如何协调节能减排与经济平稳发展的关系,对我国当前时期的经济发展具有积极的现实意义。本文采用经济分析中常用的博弈论方法,首先借助"公共地的悲剧"模型,对同行业中企业为何陷入"减排难"的困境展开分析,提出政府在节能减排实施中参与规制的必要性;其次由于政府与企业在节能减排初期存在利益冲突,本文通过"规制博弈"模型,探讨政府与企业的利益均衡,就政府应该从哪些方面对企业的行为进行激励和规制展开分析;最后提出了开展节能减排的激励与规制建议。To developing the low-carbon economy, ＂energy saving and emission reductions＂ has become a major action in China. But there exists many challenges. It is positive and significant for us to balance the relation of energy saving and emission reductions against the growth of our economic. In the view of game theory, firstly this paper analyses the situation that the enterprises are lost in the dilemma of energy saving and emission reductions with the model of ＂tragedy of the commons＂, and proposes that it is necessary for the government to participate in the implementation of energy saving and emission reductions. Secondly, for the enterprises＂ interests conflicts with the government＇s in the beginning of energy saving and emission reductions, this paper approaches the benefit equilibrium between the enterprises and the government with the model of ＂regulation game＂, and analyses what actions the government should take to incite and regulate the conduct of the enterprises. Finally it puts forward some incitation and regulation suggestions about developing energy saving and emission reductions.

关 键 词：低碳经济 节能减排 纳什均衡 博弈均衡 

分 类 号：F061.3[经济管理—政治经济学]