自由的现实性与定言命令的可能性———对康德《道德形而上学奠基》的新理解  

The Reality of Freedom and the Possibility of Categorical Imperative:Re-thinking of Kant's Groundwork for Metaphysics of Morals

作　　者：朱会晖[1] 

机构地区：[1]柏林洪堡大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学研究》2011年第12期78-86,125,共9页Philosophical Research

摘　　要：自由是康德实践哲学的精神和核心：自由观不仅构成了康德实践哲学的最抽象的层面，而且是其整个伦理学的根基；定言命令是康德道德哲学中的基本要求。然而，康德关于自由的现实性的思想，却是他被诟病最多的地方之一：根据对自由的本体化的传统解释，在实践哲学中，康德试图论证本体所具有的先验自由（独立于经验性因素而引起因果序列的能力），并对实在性、因果性这些知性范畴进行了超验的运用，将其运用于本体界，Kant takes the third way between common libertarianism and determinism and that between metaphysical dogmatism and subjectivism,so as to establish a sound footing for morality without making ontological assertion about the ontological status of freedom.Accordingly,Human beings have freedom in reality,not due to the correspondence between the idea of freedom and the attributes of noumena in themselves,but because that in the practical sphere,the idea can determine our actions in empirical world.This conception of freedom enables the removal of the misconceptions that Kant makes the transcendent use of the categories of understanding,such as reality and causality,and that Kant's attempt in Groundwork for Metaphysics of Morals fails to prove the reality of freedom itself through the necessary affirmation of freedom by human beings.Moreover,the rational endorsement of and the sentimental respect for the idea of freedom serve as the ground of the reality of freedom and the possibility of categorical imperative independently from them,thus avoiding the vicious circle between freedom and categorical imperative.

关 键 词：定言命令 自由观 道德形而上学 现实性 康德 可能性 实践哲学 道德哲学 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]