上市金融企业高管薪酬体系及其监管制度催生  

Executive Compensation of Chinese Listed Financial Companies and Management System Establishing

作　　者：王淑慧[1] 贾婧[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京化工大学经济管理学院,北京100029 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《改革》2011年第12期136-141,共6页Reform

摘　　要：以我国上市金融企业为样本,采用实证研究的方法分析金融企业高管薪酬与绩效的相关性及其影响因素。研究发现,我国上市金融企业高管薪酬与公司绩效之间没有明显的相关性,高管的固定薪酬在整体薪酬中仍然占有较大比重并且相对稳定,其整体薪酬受到市场绩效指标影响的程度比财务绩效指标的程度高。这说明我国上市金融企业薪酬结构设计存在基本薪酬过于稳定且在整体薪酬中占比较高;薪酬设计缺乏弹性;对高管的薪酬激励主要以短期为主,缺乏与绩效挂钩的中长期激励等问题。须结合我国国情,对我国上市金融企业高管薪酬进行制度设计。We take the listed financial enterprises as sample to analyze the relationship between executive compensation and their enterprise＇s financial performance; we also analyze the impact factors of executive compensation. We find that there is no significant correlation between executive pay and company＇s financial performance; their fixed salary still account for a large proportion in total compensation and stay relatively stable. The market performance indicators have a higher influence on executive compensation than the financial performance indicators. This shows that the salary structure of Chinese listed financial firms still has many design problems, for example： the basic salary is too stable and has a high proportion in the overall salary; lack of flexibility in pay design; the pay＇s incentive of its executives focus on short-term and lack of long-term performance-related incentives. In response to these problems, we propose an executive compensation design recommendations under the Chinese national conditions.

关 键 词：上市金融企业 高管薪酬 绩效 制度设计 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]