海德格尔《时间概念史序论》对胡塞尔现象学的内在批判  

Heidegger’s Immanent Critique of Husserl’s Phenomenology in Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs

作　　者：梁家荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学分析》2011年第6期70-91,193,共22页Philosophical Analysis

基　　金：上海市重点学科建设项目资助(项目编号:B001)

摘　　要：海德格尔在《时间概念史序论》的"预备部分",对现象学直到当时为止的发展做了精简扼要的回顾。在此部分第三章,他提出了对现象学的"内在批判"。海德格尔分析了胡塞尔对纯粹意识的四个规定,指出它们都不是按其存在而对之所作的规定。他的分析虽然在一些地方误解了胡塞尔,但其批判并非无的放矢,而是具有内在于现象学的根据的。In the 'Preliminary Part' of the Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, Heidegger offers a concise review of the development of phenomenology up to the time of this lecture. He proposes an immanent critique of phenomenology in the third chapter of this part, in which he analyzes four of Husserl’s determinations of pure consciousness and argues that they are not determinations of the entity in itself with regard to its being. Indeed, Heidegger misunderstood Husserl in some points and neglected some important problems of Husserl’s argument. But, contrary to Klaus Held’s opinion, the author thinks that Heidegger’s critique is not unjustified and not without phenomenological ground.

关 键 词：海德格尔 胡塞尔 现象学 意识 存在 内在批判 

分 类 号：B516.54[哲学宗教—外国哲学]