一般需求函数下两级供应链定价博弈研究  

Game-based Pricing in a Two-echelon Supply Chain with a General Demand Function

作　　者：吴燕丰[1] 张建同[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《上海管理科学》2011年第6期43-47,共5页Shanghai Management Science

摘　　要：研究需求函数为一般需求函数D=f(p)时,供应链中制造商和零售商不合作定价、合作定价的供应链利润。找出了两个充要条件,证明了在制造商和零售商之间不合作定价博弈存在纳什均衡时,该纳什均衡状态的供应链利润劣于合作定价的供应链利润。文中并且给出两个典型需求函数的例子:线性需求函数和柯布-道格拉斯需求函数。分别证明了它们均满足该两个充要条件,印证了所得结论。This paper analyzed the profit difference between cooperative pricing and non-cooperative pricing in a supply chain with a general demand function. With two necessary and sufficient conditions concerning the demand function, which was identified in the paper, it was proved that the total supply chain profit of non-cooperative pricing is inferior to that of cooperative pricing if there exists a Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative pricing game between one manufacturer and one retail in the supply chain. Two typical demand function examples were given： a linear demand function and Cobb - Douglas demand function. They both meet the two necessary and sufficient conditions, and the same conclusion, non-cooperation is inferior to cooperation, was got.

关 键 词：分散式供应链 定价 斯坦克尔伯格博弈 一般需求函数 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]