上市公司国有股权与主要高管强制变更  

Study on Forced Turnover of Key Executives and State Ownership of Listed Companies

作　　者：庞金勇[1] 朱磊[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东师范大学商学院,山东济南250014 [2]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《科学．经济．社会》2011年第4期61-65,70,共6页Science Economy Society

基　　金：山东省社科规划重点项目(10DJGJ13);山东省自然基金项目(ZR2010GL019)资助

摘　　要：与传统文献的研究角度不同,本文主要研究了上市公司不同类型的国有股东与主要高管的强制变更之间的关系。通过对未发生控股权转移条件下的上市公司主要高管强制变更现象与股东类型之间关系研究,发现公司绩效状况的好坏是评价公司主要高管经营管理能力的重要标准;投资公司型和国有法人型股东在监督主要高管方面还是存在一定效率的,政府型控股股东对上市公司的监督效率是最低的。这表明并不是所有国有股东都不利于公司治理。Different from the traditional literatures, this article mainly studies the relationship between the state owners and the forced turnovers of key executives of listed companies. Taking the listed companies whose controlling stake does not transfer as research samples, this article finds： company performance is a key indicator which is used as evaluating the company executives. State shareholders of investment type and legal entity both have some efficiency in supervising the corporate executives. This shows that not all state -owned shareholders are unconducive to corporate governance. In all types of state - owned shareholders, the govermnent controlled shareholders of listed companies have the lowest efficiency in supervision.

关 键 词：国有股东 主要高管 强制变更 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]