排污权交易与指令控制条件下寡头厂商的均衡分析  

Analysis for Tradable Emission Permits and a Command & Control System under Duopoly

作　　者：周朝民[1] 李寿德[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2011年第6期677-681,共5页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70873084)

摘　　要：在排污权市场和产品市场存在交互影响时,产品市场上的寡头博弈行为会影响排污权交易的市场效率。在排污权市场是完全竞争,而产品市场是寡头垄断时,排污权交易会引起产品市场份额由治污高效厂商向治污低效厂商的转移。比较了指令控制和排污权交易2种机制下,寡头厂商的古诺博弈均衡结果及其对社会总福利的影响,研究表明,均衡结果会受到产品差异度的影响。Duopoly game in product market influences the emissions trading market efficiency when there exists interactive influence between the emissions market and the product market.When the emission market is perfectly competitive and the product market is oligopolistic,the emission trading ensures transfer of permits to the less efficient abatement firms.This paper compares the Cournot equilibriums and the social welfare effects of duopoly game under emission trading system and command and control system.The result indicates that the equilibrium will be affected by the degree of product difference.

关 键 词：排污权交易 寡头垄断 产品差异度 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]