达米特对本体论的语义哲学消解  

Dummett's Semantic Dissolution of Metaphysics

作　　者：亓学太[1] 翟玉章[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京邮电大学人文与社会科学学院,江苏南京210046 [2]南京师范大学哲学系,江苏南京210046

出　　处：《北方论丛》2012年第1期143-147,共5页The Northern Forum

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目批准号:10YJC720032);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究基金资助项目(项目编号:2010SJB720012)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：达米特的研究纲领对实在论与反实在论之争赋予了新的解释,强调这种争论是关于所争议对象语言陈述意义的理论分歧,而不应当是本体论层面的纷争,由此对传统本体论进行了语言哲学的转化与消解。实在主义依赖于真值条件意义理论和背后的古典逻辑二值原则,但它无法解释不可决语句的意义。达米特提出的反实在论以可断言条件取代真值条件、以直觉主义逻辑取代古典逻辑,解决了不可决语句的意义性问题,克服了实在论面临的理论困境。Dummett＇ s research program provides a new interpretation of the realism/anti - realism debate, which maintains that the debate ought to be a dispute on the meaning theory of statements of the disputed class, instead of a dispute on its metaphysics. The theoretical framework of realismis the truth - conditional theory of meaning and the underlying principle of bivalence of classical logic, which cannot explain the meaning of undecidable statements. Dummett suggests a version of anti - realism in which the notion of truth condition is replaced by that of assertability condition, and the principles of classical logic replaced by those of intuitionist log- ic. As a result, this version of anti - realism has no difficulty explaining the meaning of undecidables, a problem facing realism.

关 键 词：本体论 语义理论 意义 达米特 

分 类 号：B561.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]