EPR激励机制研究——基于动态博弈的视角  

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of EPR——Based on Dynamic Game Analysis

作　　者：郑云虹[1] 田海峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学,沈阳110004

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2011年第12期24-30,共7页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"EPR回收产业链纵向交易关系的形成机理;绩效评价与规制研究"(项目编号:71103030);国家自然科学基金项目"基于外部性优化配置的产业链环境治理理论与应用研究"(项目编号:71173034)

摘　　要：《循环经济促进法》框架下的中国EPR制度存在着制度安排缺失的问题。采用动态博弈分析方法探讨了EPR制度下政府与厂商之间的关系,揭示了厂商在政府不同的EPR制度设计下的行为反应,推演出了EPR制度的激励机制。研究发现:厂商承担EPR责任的态度决定了其对末端产品回收利用的效果,而厂商的态度取决于政府EPR制度的设计。以此为基础,提出了具有激励性的EPR制度体系应包括激励性制度和约束性制度两方面内容的观点。Resources waste and environment pollution caused by end-of-life product have become the outstanding problem the affecting the sustainable development of China＇s economy and society.The practice of developed countries proved that the EPR is valid in solving the problem of the end-of-life product.The key to implement effectively EPR system is a series of stimulating systems.EPR system which under the framework of the＂Circular Economy Promotion Law＂has the problem of the lack of system arrangements in China.By the dynamic game for the government and the producers,the paper revealed the producer＇s reaction under the different EPR system designs,pointed out that the producer＇s attitude bearing the EPR responsibility determines the recycling effect for its end-of-life product,the producer＇s attitude depends on the EPR system designed by the government,deduced out the incentive mechanism of the EPR system,and then,presented the view that the stimulating EPR systems should include the incentive systems and the binding systems.

关 键 词：激励机制 博弈 延伸生产者责任(EPR) 末端产品(EOL) 

分 类 号：F243.5[经济管理—劳动经济]