基于法律环境和两权分离的利益侵占研究——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据  

Legal System Environment—Based and,the Separation of Ownership and Control Right and Benefit Embezzlement: Empirical Evidence from China Private Listed Companies

作　　者：吴宗法[1] 张英丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海201804

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2012年第1期90-98,共9页Journal of Audit & Economics

摘　　要：利用2003—2007年我国民营上市公司的数据,计量分析控股股东对上市公司的利益侵占,实证检验控制权和所有权的分离、法律制度环境对公司利益侵占的影响。研究发现:公司所有权和控制权分离度越低,利益侵占水平就越低;上市公司所在地区的法律制度环境越好,利益侵占水平就越低;控制权与所有权的分离为控制股东侵占中小股东利益提供了动机和便利,使得这类公司存在更大的代理问题,而解决此问题的关键在于改善法律制度的环境和加强对投资者的法律保护。By using the data from China private listed companies during the period form 2003 to2007, and taking the capital embezzlement of listed companies by the holding stockholders as a measurement of benefit embezzlement, we have done an empirical study to examine the effect imposed by the separation of control right and ownership and the influence of the legal system environment on the benefit embezzlement. It is found that the lower the separation level, the lower the embezzlement level; the better the legal system environment of the district of the company, lower the embezzlement level. The separation of control right and ownership provides motivation and convenience for controlling the benefit embezzlement of small and medium stockholders by the holding stockholders, as a result, there will be more problems of agency arising among such companies. Therefore, the key to settling the problem lies in improving the legal system environment and strengthening the legal protection of investors.

关 键 词：所有权和控制权 股权结构 两权分离 代理问题 利益侵占 法律制度环境 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]