专家如实报告私有信息的激励相容性  

Incentive compatibility for experts reporting private information truthfully

作　　者：卢光松[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽建筑工业学院管理学院,安徽合肥230022

出　　处：《中国科学技术大学学报》2011年第12期1107-1112,共6页JUSTC

基　　金：安徽高校省级自然科学研究重点项目(KJ2010A062)资助

摘　　要：分析了决策者与专家之间的策略性信息传递,决策者就一个不确定二分决策问题向多名专家咨询以获取信息,假定决策者与专家的偏好信息都是私密的.用怀疑阈值表示决策者的偏好,得出了所有专家如实报告私有信息的必要条件,指出决策者仅咨询一名专家时该专家的信息传递策略不同于该专家作为决策者所咨询的多名专家之一时他的信息传递策略,任一专家的报告对最终决策具有决定性影响的概率,一般不等于采用阈值为决策者怀疑阈值期望值的决策规则时该专家具有决定性影响的概率.The strategic information transmission between a decision maker and experts was analyzed.The decision maker elicited information from multiple experts regarding an uncertain dichotomous decision problem.The preferences of the decision maker and the experts were assumed to be private and the decision maker＇s preference was denoted by his threshold of doubt.The necessary conditions were identified for all experts reporting their private information truthfully.It is shown that every expert＇s strategy for information transmission when he is one of multiple experts being consulted is different from that when he is the only one.And every expert＇s pivotal probability for the final decision is generally not equal to his pivotal probability under the majoritarian decision rule with a quota being the expected threshold of doubt of the decision maker.

关 键 词：决策 信息传递 NASH均衡 偏好 

分 类 号：C934[经济管理—管理学]