监事股权激励、合谋倾向与公司治理约束——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证研究  

Equity Incentives granted to Supervisor,Collision Orientation and Corporate Governance Restriction——Empirical Research Based on Listed Companies' Panel Data in China

作　　者：徐宁[1,2] 徐向艺[2] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学应用经济学博士后流动站,山东济南250100 [2]山东大学管理学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《经济管理》2012年第1期41-49,共9页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：山东省博士后创新基金"管理层激励与山东上市公司治理效率优化"(201103065);山东大学自主创新基金"上市公司股权激励契约优化:动态内生视角的理论与实证研究"(2011GN015)

摘　　要：授予监事股权激励究竟能够提高其监督积极性,还是导致其独立性削弱从而增加合谋风险?本文从公司治理整合视角出发,运用2006～2009年中国上市公司的面板数据对监事股权激励效应进行了实证检验。经研究发现,由监事股权激励所引致的双向合谋风险在实践中并未显现;相反,却在债权融资约束与独立董事监督的调节作用下,监事股权激励与第一类代理成本呈显著的负相关关系,抑制了监事与代理人之间的合谋倾向;并且在股权制衡度的调节作用下,对第二类代理问题也具有显著的治理效应,抑制了监事与委托人之间的合谋倾向。由此可知,监事股权激励并非引致合谋的真正缘由,公司治理约束机制的完善才是实现监事股权激励效应并有效规避合谋风险的前提与保障。Taking the opportunity of the split share reform, Chinese listed companies began to explore and develop equity-based incentives. On the condition that the institution environment is not mature enough, the reasonable selection and distribution of incentive objects are the keys to realize and maximize the incentive effect. To en- sure supervisors＇ independence, China Securities Regulatory Commission （CSRC） announced that equity incentives granted to supervisors are forbidden. The relative policies not only induce the suspension of many listed com- panies＇ equity incentive plan, but also make many superiors resign and rotate. The theoretical problem behind this system transformation attracts the attention of many researchers at home and aboard. Do equity-based incentives granted to supervisors have a positive or negative effect on governance efficiency？ So the rationality of supervisor eq- uity incentives becomes the points at issue. The main objective of our paper is to find theoretical and empirical evi- dences for the above issue to be solved urgently. In the one-tier corporate governance system just as American, the potential effects of the equity incentives granted to the independent directors/or audit committee members have been the subject of many studies. The colli- sion risks caused by the equity incentives granted to the audit committee members are mainly displayed in the recent financial crisis. Archambeault et al. （2008） and Cullinan et al. （2010） find an association between audit commit- tee incentive-based compensation and financial reporting failures reported in restatements. A plausible explanation for the findings reported in the above studies is that granting options to directors aligns directors＇ financial interests more closely with management, management, who also typically have large numbers of stock options （Persellin, 2009）. Chinese listed companies adopt a two-tier board structure, a Board of Directors and a Supervisory Board. According to the special characteristies

关 键 词：监事 股权激励 合谋倾向 公司治理整合 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]