基于真实交易盈余管理的股权制衡治理效应  

The Effectiveness of Governance Check-and-Balance Ownership Structure Based on Real Earnings Management

作　　者：林芳[1] 许慧[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430223 [2]广东工业大学管理学院,广东广州510520

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2012年第1期83-93,共11页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(课题编号:70872110)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：公司治理中的一些因素会对公司管理层进行应计盈余管理起到限制作用,其是否也会影响公司管理层进行真实交易盈余管理尚未有充足的证据。因此,本文就股权制衡这一治理结构安排与公司管理层进行的真实交易盈余管理予以实证检验,研究发现,股权制衡能在一定程度上有效地降低管理层在产品成本方面和可操纵性费用方面的真实交易盈余管理和整体调节利润的操纵程度。本文对股权制衡会抑制真实交易盈余管理的研究结论提供了新的解释,为进一步认识股权制衡的公司治理功效提供了支持性证据。Some scholars early have shown that a number of corporate governance factors should play a limited role in terms of accrual-based earnings management,but we don＇t have sufficient evidence that whether corporate governance could affect the real earnings management.Therefore,this article takes an empirical test to check the relation between the check-and-balance ownership on the governance structures and the extent of real earnings management,we find that the check-and-balance ownership has a certain degree effectively reduce the face of product cost and discretionary expenses in real earnings management and the overall degree adjust the profit manipulation.The findings of this research article,which is check-and-balance ownership inhibits the real earnings management provides us a new interpretation,furthermore,in order to further understand the effectiveness of the balances of shares on the corporate governance,it also provides some supporting evidence.

关 键 词：股权制衡 真实交易盈余管理 应计盈余管理 公司治理 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]