阶段融资框架下的风险投资企业控制权配置研究  

The Allocation of Control Rights in Stage Financing of Ventures

作　　者：王声凑[1] 曾勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《管理评论》2012年第1期139-145,共7页Management Review

基　　金：高校博士点基金项目(200806140016);国家自然科学基金项目(70540022)

摘　　要：基于不完全合约理论,在阶段融资架构下,分析了控制权初始占优配置以及随阶段进程的重新谈判与转移过程。通过分析两种不同控制权初始配置的优劣势并对其效率进行比较,本文发现项目发展前景和双方阶段融资时刻的谈判能力将影响控制权的初始占优配置;在阶段融资时刻,项目的盈利能力水平决定了风险投资家的最优阶段投资决策以及阶段时刻控制权的最优调整。研究结论解释了Kaplan和Str觟mberg关于控制权配置的实证结果。Based on the incomplete contract theory, this paper discusses the optimal initial allocation of control right and the renegotiation under the framework of stage financing. Through the analys＇s of the advantages and disadvantages of two different allocations of control rights and the comparison of their efficiency, we find that the optimal initial allocation of control right is affected by the project development prospects and the bargaining power in the stage financing moment. Meanwhile, the different level of projects profitability determines the optimal phase of venture capitalists investment decisions, as well as the optimal phase adjustment of the control rights. The conclusion of the study explains the empirical results of Kaplan ＆ Str？mberg （2003, 2004） on the allocation of the control rights.

关 键 词：阶段融资 不完全合约 控制权 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]