产学研协作中的研究人员报酬激励及风险研究  

Research on the Incentive Compensation and Risk of Researchers of the Cooperation of Enterprises,Universities and Research Institutes

作　　者：盛永祥[1,2] 田立新[1] 马少辉[2] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学工商管理学院,江苏镇江212003 [2]江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏镇江212003

出　　处：《软科学》2012年第1期72-75,82,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70871057);江苏教育科学"十一五"规划项目(D/2009/01/050);江苏科技大学博士科研启动基金

摘　　要：针对产学研协作过程中研究人员和企业工作之间关系的不同特点,运用委托代理理论分析研究人员的报酬激励和风险承担问题。研究结果表明:单项工作中在完全信息下研究人员的报酬大小取决于企业和研究人员的行动次序,而在不完全信息下取决于研究人员努力所产生的信号、风险厌恶程度和信号误差;多名研究人员从事竞争性的工作通过采取竞赛提高研究人员的激励作用同时降低风险,多名研究人员从事互补性工作则采取帮助提高研究人员的激励作用但也增加风险,一名研究人员从事多项工作时如果给予信号反应较强的激励则使研究人员承担较大的风险,同时也分析其他激励如合作地位上升和股利分配的作用等。According to the different characteristics of relationship between researchers and enterprises in the process of cooperation of enterprises,universities and research institutes,the principal-agent theory is used to analyze the staff incentive and reward risk issues.The results show that: the reward of individual researcher in the complete information depends on the order of action,and in the incomplete information depends on the research efforts of the signals,risk aversion and signal error;researchers in competitive work improve incentives and reduce risk through competition;researchers in complementary work improve the incentives but increase the risk through help;a researcher in many jobs takes greater risks if given the strong incentive response signal.The other incentives such as increasing cooperation status and the role of dividend distribution are also discussed.

关 键 词：产学研 研究人员 报酬激励 风险 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]