两层次广告博弈中供应商的一种批发价协调策略  

ONE WHOLESALE PRICE COORDINATING STRATEGY FOR THE MANUFACTURER IN A TWO-STAGE ADVERTISING GAME

作　　者：肖成勇[1] 王谦[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院研究生院管理学院,北京100190

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2011年第11期1504-1510,共7页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70731003);国家自然科学基金(70601031)

摘　　要：研究了在包含一个供应商和两个零售商的供应链中的广告博弈协调问题.将该问题构造为一个两层次的博弈:供应商与零售商之间的Stackelberg博弈以及零售商之间的合作博弈.供应商作为整个供应链上的主导者,拥有产品批发价和零售价的决策权,而零售商则通过在当地市场上的广告促销投入来影响需求,进而影响整个供应链的收益.研究发现,供应商可以通过简单地设定适当的批发价来影响零售商的广告促销投入,从而使得整个供应链实现最大收益.We consider a two stage advertising game in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers, in which the manufacturer sells its goods through the two retailers in a local market. The manufacturer plays a dominant role in the supply chain, and deicides the wholesale price and retail price. The retailers can influence the profits for the supply chain through advertising and promotion in the local market. The analysis shows that by setting the wholesale price to the level of marginal cost, the manufacturer can make the supply chain to maximize the profits.

关 键 词：广告博弈 供应链协调 批发价协调 STACKELBERG博弈 合作博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] O225[经济管理—国民经济]