中国上市公司高额现金持有行为溯因:融资约束理论抑或委托代理理论  

A Study of the Causes of Large Amount Cash Holding of China's Listed Companies:Financing Restraint Theory or Principal-Agent Theory

作　　者：宋常[1] 刘笑松[1] 黄蕾[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872 [2]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《当代财经》2012年第2期121-128,共8页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"资本市场发展中基础性制度建设研究"(06BTY112);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(11XNH157)

摘　　要：对于公司高额现金持有行为的理论解释主要有委托代理理论和融资约束理论,文章利用中国上市公司样本数据进行多角度考察与实证检验,发现高额现金持有公司具有盈利能力强、成长性好、股利支付少、高管持股低、代理成本小等诸多公司特征;通过融资约束分组检验发现,高融资约束公司的"现金—现金流敏感性"显著为正,融资约束使得上市公司具有较强的现金积累倾向与偏好。实证研究表明:与委托代理理论相比,融资约束理论更适用于解释中国上市公司的高额现金持有行为。There are mainly two theories that explain the corporate behavior of large amount cash holding： the financing restraint theory and the principal-agent theory.This paper makes use of the sample data of China＇s listed companies to conduct multi-angle examinations and empirical tests.It is found that the companies holding large amount of cashes have such characteristics as high profitability,sound development,less dividend payment,low managerial ownership and less agency cost,etc.Through the group test of financing restraint,it is found that the companies with higher financing restrains have a significant positive cash-cash flow sensitivity,and the financing restraints force the listed companies to have stronger cash accumulating tendency and preference.The empirical study indicates that compared with the principal-agent theory,the financing restraint theory is more appropriate to explain the large amount cash holding behaviors of China＇s listed companies.

关 键 词：高额现金持有 融资约束 委托代理 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]