缺货厌恶下的供应链收益共享契约模型  

Revenue-Sharing Contract of Supply Chain with Retailer Having Stockout-Averse

作　　者：庞庆华[1,2] 申竹沁[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏常州213022 [2]河海大学企业信息化与工业工程研究所,江苏常州213022

出　　处：《太原师范学院学报（自然科学版）》2011年第4期116-121,共6页Journal of Taiyuan Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(10YJC630188);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2011B04814);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2011SJD630006);河海大学创新基金项目(09B002-04)

摘　　要：收益共享契约是实现供应链系统绩效改善或完美协调的一种机制.在随机市场需求下,针对由制造商、分销商和零售商组成的三级供应链,考虑了零售商具有缺货厌恶决策偏好,建立了此时的供应链收益共享契约协调模型,分析了零售商的缺货厌恶对供应链系统的最优定购量、上游企业提供的批发价格以及供应链成员收益的影响.研究表明:在零售商具有缺货厌恶时,分销商提供的批发价格和收益分享份额均高于零售商为风险中性时分销商所提供的契约参数,且随着零售商缺货厌恶的增加而增加.零售商的缺货厌恶对制造商所提供的契约参数没有影响,但会影响到制造商的利润,且随着零售商缺货厌恶的增加而增加.最后用算例来验证了文中的有关结论.Revenue-Sharing（RS）contract is a kind of mechanism to improve the performance or to achieve the perfect coordination of supply chain（SC）.Considering retailer having sockout-averse preference,it proposes a model of an SC contract aimed at coordinating a three-level SC,which is based on revenue sharing mechanism,and the customer demand is stochastic.Then by analyzing the model,it explains that how the retailer′s sotckout-averse preferences influences the optimal order quantity,the quota of revenue sharing and supply chain coordination.The result shows：when retailer has stockout-averse decision bias,the wholesale price that distributor charges retailer and the quota of the retailer′s revenue that retailer gives distributor will increase with the retailer′s stockout-averse decision bias increasing.The supplier′s stockout-averse decision bias doesn′t influence the contact parameters that the manufacturer provides,but it influences the manufacturer′s revenue,and increase with the retailer′s stockout-averse decision.In the end,a numerical experiment is given to test the correctness of the model.

关 键 词：供应链管理 收益共享契约 缺货厌恶 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]