对上市公司高管辞职套现的思考与对策建议  被引量:3

Thoughts and Strategies on Resignation Monetizing of Executives in Listed Companies

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作  者:孙玉甫[1] 董红亮[1] 颜玲[1] 

机构地区:[1]天津商业大学商学院,天津300134

出  处:《天津商业大学学报》2012年第1期39-43,48,共6页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce

摘  要:现有大多数的研究认为应该限制上市公司高管辞职套现行为或增加其成本,但也有研究认为那会损害股票市场发展。笔者认为导致争论的原因在于缺乏对其实质的分析,而是简单地从外在现象出发去寻找原因和拟定对策。本文认为套现是一种正常的市场行为,只要不会因此导致公司的成长性受到不利影响,就不应进行限制。为了防止损害公司成长性必须严格限制出资者通过高估成长性获得股票发行价的虚高,进而通过套现损害股票市场发展,而具体手段就是以承诺收益法进行出资估价、人力资本出资者退出即注销其股权和公开募股价与特殊股权持有者保证的最低成长性挂钩。Most of the existing researches suggest restricting resignation monetizing of executives or increasing its cost.However,some people think that it will hinder the development of the stock market.The author holds that the debate on this question results from lacking substantive analysis,finding causes and developing strategies just by studying external phenomenon.This paper argues that monetizing is a normal market behavior and shouldn't be restricted as long as it will not hinder the company's growth.It's necessary to protect the company's growth from damage and it should be strictly restricted that investors get higher issue price of stock by overestimating the company's growth to do harm to the stock market by monetizing.The specific measures are as follows: the investment is evaluated through promised income approach;human capital investors' shares are cancelled when the investors resign from the company;and the public offering price is linked with the minimum growth guaranteed by special equity holders.

关 键 词:辞职套现 公司成长性 股权激励 承诺收益法 人力资本退出 

分 类 号:F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]

 

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