超越弗雷格的“第三域”神话  

Beyond Frege's Myth of "the Third Realm"

作　　者：陈波[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学哲学系

出　　处：《哲学研究》2012年第2期61-72,128-129,共12页Philosophical Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地(北京大学外国哲学研究所)项目"对克里普克语言哲学的系统性质疑和对一种新理论的建构"(编号11JJD720001)的研究成果

摘　　要：如达米特所指出的：“弗雷格关于思想及其构成涵义的看法是神话式的。这些恒久不变的实体居住在‘第三域’（thethirdrealm），后者既不同于物理世界，也不同于任何经验主体的内心世界……。只要这样一种看法处于支配地位，一切都将是神秘莫测的。”（Dummett，P．251．黑体系引者所标）我同意以上说法。在本文中，我将关注一个中心问题：如何给弗雷格的思想理论去神秘化。This paper critically examines Frege's anti-psychologism,and reaches the following conclusions:(1) Frege's theory of thought is internally inconsistent:a thought cannot be the sense of a sentence and also be prior to language,and even independent of human thinking and mind.(2) The theory has to face many problems difficult or even impossible to solve,e.g.how do we grasp a thought? How do we determine whether a thought is true or false? How can we identify the sameness of thoughts? How can we make clear the complicate relations among the objects of the third realm?(3) It is the source of all the troubles with the theory that Frege implicitly holds that there are only two extremes,i.e.a pure and complete subjectivity and a pure and complete objectivity,and lacks an intermediate category of inter-subjectivity to be the bridge from pure objectivity to pure subjectivity.Finally,this paper develops an alternative theory of thought resulting from the revision of Frege's theory of thought.

关 键 词：弗雷格 神话 物理世界 内心世界 经验主体 思想理论 中心问题 达米特 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]