博弈论视角下我国工资集体协商制度之构建  

A Study of Chinese Wage Formation Mechanism Underpinned by Collective Bargaining from the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：徐江萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学文法学院,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第1期90-94,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(09CFX022)

摘　　要：工资集体协商是市场经济的内在要求,能够发挥规范劳动力市场,促进劳动力合理流动,维护劳动者权益,提高企业经济效益,缓解劳资矛盾,促进社会和谐发展的作用。在我国现行法律制度下,工资集体协商制度流于形式,功能不能有效发挥。工资集体协商的过程是劳动者和企业追求各自利益最大化的一种博弈行为。可以运用博弈理论,明确劳动者和企业在工资集体协商中的地位,构建规范的协商机制,建立完善的工资分配共决机制。Collective bargaining based wage formation, an inherent part of the market economy, helps to normalize labor market, guarantee the healthy flow of labors, protect their rights, enhance economic efficiency of enterprises, mitigate the conflict between employers and workers and do good to the harmonious development of the society. This type of wage formation,however, becomes more a formality than an effective mechanism in the context of Chinese legal system. Wage formation underpinned by collective bargaining is the strategic game where both employers and worker maximize their interests. This paper employs the theory of game to specify and clarify the role of the two participants, discuss the establishment of normative collective bargaining and the perfecting of jointly deciding wage formation mechanism.

关 键 词：工资集体协商 劳动者 企业 工会 博弈 

分 类 号：D922.51[政治法律—民商法学]