基于不完全信息的惩罚制度博弈的食品安全监管研究  

On Food Safety Regulations Based on Punishment System Games of Incomplete Information

作　　者：庄新英[1] 孙绍荣[1] 宋玉强[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《技术与创新管理》2012年第1期28-31,共4页Technology and Innovation Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于符号和结构图及计算的行为管理制度设计方法研究"(70871080);上海市重点学科"管理科学与工程"(S30504)

摘　　要：通过对我国食品安全问题现状进行分析,运用博弈论方法,建立了劣质产品生产企业与市场监管者之间的博弈模型,从定量化的角度分析得出,解决问题的关键在于加大对失职监管部门的处罚力度;其次,运用行为管理制度模型中惩罚性制度的数学模型,进一步分析在惩罚性制度下监管部门按照人们所期望的意图选择"作为"的临界值,最后,根据这两个模型分析结果,提出了一些针对性的政策建议。Through analyzing the current situation of food safety in China and using the Game Theory, the author builds th~ game model between low-quality products manufacturing enterprises and the regulators. From the quantitative point of view, the author comes to conclusion that the key to the problem is to increase penalties of the regulatory authorities for dereliction of duty. The mathematical model system of behavioral management is used to analyze the critical value of the regtdatory au- thorities＇choosing the desired ＂as＂ under the punishment system in accordance with the intention of people. Finally, based on analysis of the two models, the author puts forward some relevant policy proposals.

关 键 词：食品安全 博弈论 监管部门 惩罚制度 

分 类 号：C939[经济管理—管理学]