削减量信息不完全条件下双寡头厂商治污技术投资决策  

Investment Decision of Pollution Abatement Technology for Symmetric Duopoly with Incomplete Information on Pollution Discharge Reduction

作　　者：孙卫[1] 刘民婷[1] 梁玑华[1] 李寿德[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,西安710049 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2012年第1期83-86,共4页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70873084)

摘　　要：基于赢者通吃和信息不完全的假设,建立了削减量信息不完全下,双寡头厂商治污技术投资期权博弈模型,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明,厂商的博弈均衡存在且唯一,对称厂商的均衡结果为同时均衡;不对称厂商的均衡结果可能为序贯均衡、抢先均衡或同时均衡。Under the assumptions of winner-takes-all and incomplete information, the option game model of pollution abatement technology investment for Symmetric duopoly with incomplete of pollution dis- charge reduction is constructed and numerically studied. The results show that there exists a unique equi- librium in the game. The equilibrium of symmetric duopoly is a collusive equilibrium, while the equilibri- um of asymmetric duopoly may be preemption, sequential or collusive equilibrium.

关 键 词：治污技术投资 信息不完全 削减量 期权博弈 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]