谈判力与军事人力资本投资收益分配博弈  

Bargaining Power and the Revenue Distribution Game of Military Human Capital Investment

作　　者：柯闻秀[1] 黄健柏[1] 陈名千[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083 [2]成都军区装备部,四川成都610000

出　　处：《系统工程》2011年第12期84-87,共4页Systems Engineering

摘　　要：军事人力资本投资收益分配主要由军队组织和军人个体的谈判力决定。通过构建博弈模型,分析军队组织和军人个体在军事人力资本投资收益分配中的博弈过程及规律。期初拥有较强谈判力的军队在谈判中获得较多收益,但随着军人军事人力资本存量增加和军事专用性增强,军人个体的谈判力随之增强,投资收益分配的博弈就会重复多次,最终趋向双方的合意份额,博弈均衡结果受出价次序和贴现因子等因素的影响。The military human capital investment income distribution depends on the bargaining power of both the army organization and military individual. Through building a military human capital investment income distribution model, this paper explores the process and the regularity of distribution of the military human capital investment income between army organization and military individuals. In the beginning,army organizations with stronger bargaining power will get more benefits.However,with the increase of military human capital stocks and the enhancement of its military specificity,the soldier＇s bargaining power and the number of games will also increase.Finally it tends towards desirability share of the two sides.The result of the game equilibrium mainly depends on bid order and discount factor.

关 键 词：谈判力 军事人力资本 收益分配 博弈 

分 类 号：E263[军事—军事理论]