基于演化博弈理论的企业间合作违约惩罚机制  

The Default Punishment Mechanism of Cooperation among Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

作　　者：罗剑锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083

出　　处：《系统工程》2012年第1期27-31,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：湖南省哲学社会科学基金委托项目(2010JD02)

摘　　要：利用演化博弈理论,建立企业间合作的违约惩罚机制模型,并进行了数值仿真研究。研究结果表明:当违约金不足以抵消背叛策略带来的超额收益时,系统将进入"囚徒困境",演化至双方均背叛;当双方都背叛时的收益最小、自己合作对方背叛的收益比双方都背叛的收益大、自己背叛对方合作的收益最大时,系统演化为"鹰-鸽博弈";当双方收益能达到双赢时,系统会演化至双方均合作或均背叛的极端;而当违约金数额足够大时,违约金机制将很好地抑制合作过程中可能出现的机会主义倾向,促进企业顺利开展长期稳定的合作。With the method of evolutionary game theory,this paper established a model for default punishment mechanism of cooperation among enterprises,and then did the numerical simulation research.The results show that： when the penalty is not sufficient to offset the excess profit brought by the betrayal strategy,the system will fall into ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂,that is,both enterprises will betray each other;when both betraying each other,the yields are smallest,who cooperate only gains more than both betraying,and who betrays only gains the largest profit,the system will evolve to ＂Eagle dove game＂;when the two sides can achieve a win-win situation,the system will evolve to both cooperating or both betraying;and when the penalty is large enough,the penalty mechanism will effectively restrain the opportunistic tendency during the cooperation,and promote enterprise to cooperate smoothly and stably for a long term.

关 键 词：企业间合作 违约惩罚机制 演化博弈 违约金 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]