食品市场监管与违规博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of Food Market Supervision and Violation

作　　者：马飞雄[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学,广州510632 [2]广东外语外贸大学,广州510420

出　　处：《广东外语外贸大学学报》2012年第1期43-45,51,共4页Journal of Guangdong University of Foreign Studies

基　　金：广东省软科学项目(编号:2010B070300085)资助

摘　　要：本文通过对食品市场监管与违规的博弈分析表明:市场参与者(生产者)是否违规,取决于违规获利的大小与违规被查出的损失大小比较,即被处罚的力度越大,市场参与者(生产者)违规的概率越小。在非对称信息条件下,食品市场监管者对违规事件的查处结果具有示范效应。市场参与者(生产者)通过观察监管者对过去违规事件的查处结果信息,不断修正其对监管者信誉的判断,并推测其对未来违规事件的查处方式,据以做出是否违规的决策,这存在一种学习机制。Based on a game analysis of food market supervision and violation, this study shows that whether food pro- ducers are illegal depends on the size of the illegal profits and that of the＇loss because of violation, that is, the more the food producers are fined, the smaller the probability of violation. In the condition of asymmetric information, the punishments made of violations by the food market supervisor have a demonstration effect on food producers. Food producers constantly modify their judgments of the credibility of the supervisor, by observing the punishment information about their past violations, and speculate the supervisor＇s way to handle their future violations, so as to decide whether to conduct violations. This is a learning mechanism.

关 键 词：市场监管 违规 示范效应 学习机制 

分 类 号：F713.58[经济管理—市场营销]