政府决策的代理理论分析  

Analysis on government decision-making with agency theory

作　　者：王春香[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学继续教育学院,北京100872

出　　处：《大连海事大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第1期34-38,共5页Journal of Dalian Maritime University(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：政府决策比企业决策复杂,也更难给出统一的分析框架。尝试用企业决策分析的代理理论框架来认识和分析政府决策,发现按照这个分析框架,可以推导出政府决策中的各种潜在问题,从而说明代理理论框架也是分析政府决策的有效工具。The decision-making of government is more complex than that of the enterprises;it is also difficult to come up with a unified analytical framework. This paper attempted to understand and analyze government decision-making with the agency theory framework which is normally used in the analysis of enterprises decisions-making.The effectiveness of this analytical framework is proved because we can derive a variety of potential problems in government decision-making.

关 键 词：政府决策 目标 约束条件 代理问题 代理成本 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F272-0[经济管理—企业管理]