公司动机、审计师声誉和自愿性内部控制鉴证报告——基于A股公司2008—2009年年报的经验研究  

Companies' Incentives,Auditors' Reputation and Voluntary Internal Control Audit Reporting——An Empirical Study Based on A Share Companies' Annual Reports from2008 to 2009

作　　者：方红星[1] 戴捷敏[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,116025 [2]南京审计学院金审学院,211815

出　　处：《会计研究》2012年第2期87-95,97,共9页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70872018);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(2009JJD790005)的阶段性成果;霍英东教育基金会高等学校青年教师基金项目(111087);南京审计学院校级课题(NSK2009/C09)的资助

摘　　要：上市公司是否自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告,不仅取决于公司自身的披露动机,而且取决于审计师是否愿意出具内部控制鉴证报告。本文利用沪深两市上市公司在2008—2009年年报中自愿披露内部控制鉴证信息所带来的研究机会,实证考察了内部控制鉴证报告这一特殊的自愿信息披露行为的决定因素。研究发现,降低代理冲突和传递信号不仅是上市公司自愿披露内部控制鉴证报告的主要动机,而且是其自愿提高鉴证信息披露质量(扩大鉴证范围和提高保证程度)的主要动机;审计师声誉越高,越不愿意出具内部控制鉴证报告和为公司的内部控制提供高程度保证;大股东与中小股东之间的代理冲突以及内部控制质量会显著影响审计师对鉴证风险水平的评估,进而影响内部控制鉴证报告的鉴证范围和保证程度。Different from other voluntary disclosures,the managers' decision whether or not they voluntarily disclose the audit reports of internal control,has depended not only on their incentives of disclosure,but also on the auditors' willing to report.Taking the opportunity of voluntarily disclosure of the audit reports on internal control during 2008—2009,we study the determinants of this voluntary disclosure.We find that not only the objective of lowering agency conflicts and signaling are the key incentives to lead managers voluntary disclosure the audit report on internal control,but also to make managers promote the quality of voluntary disclosure information,such as extending the scope and augment assurance level of the audit reports on internal control.Moreover,auditors with better reputations are not willing to provide audit reports on internal control and make reasonable assurance.Lastly,it is that agency conflict between control shareholders and minority and the quality of internal control,play a role in auditor's judgment on audit risk of internal control,in turn,which affects the scope and assurance level of audit of internal control.

关 键 词：代理冲突 信号显示 内部控制鉴证 审计师声誉 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F239.4[经济管理—国民经济] F275F224