机会公平、倾斜政策与不对称锦标赛:一项实验研究  

Equal Opportunity Laws,Affirmative Action and Asymmetric Tournaments: Some Experimental Evidence

作　　者：闫威[1] 陈长怀[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2012年第1期89-97,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJC790225);重庆大学中央高校基本科研业务费科研专项人文社会科学类面上项目(CDJSK10 00 54;CDJSK11 070)

摘　　要：采用实验研究的方法评价机会公平规则和倾斜政策对员工努力水平及雇主收益的影响。利用对130个被试进行的7个实验,本文获得了如下研究结论:与基准实验相比,在不公平锦标赛实验中,被试的努力水平有所降低;在不对称锦标赛实验中,随着代理人能力不对称程度逐渐增加,有利被试和不利被试选择的努力水平均会减少;在倾斜政策实验中,实施倾斜政策并没有增加员工的总产出,因而也没有提高雇主的收益。文末从企业组织和政府政策两方面分析了研究结论的实际意义。Since 1980＇s, the rank-order tournament theory based on relative performance evaluation （RPE） has received attentien by scholars in many different disciplines. In the business discipline, the tournament theory has been extended into three models： unfair tournament model, uneven tournament model and affirmative action model. According to the unfair tournament model, some workers have competitive advantages over others in the sense that their output has been added artificially in order to exceed the output of their competitors. According to the uneven tournament model, employees with different abilities are assigned different cost functions so that some employees are faced with higher costs than the others. The combination of unfair tournament and uneven tournament would define an affirmative action model in which the cost-disadvantaged workers are compensated by the increase of output.

关 键 词：机会公平 倾斜政策 不对称锦标赛 实验研究 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F240[经济管理—国民经济]