负债代理冲突下企业投融资互动行为的实物期权分析  

REAL OPTION ANALYSIS ON INVESTMENT AND FINANCING INTERACTIVE BEHAVIOR OF CORPORATIONS UNDER AGENCY CONFLICT OF DEBT

作　　者：王治[1] 张新华[1] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济与管理学院,长沙410114

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2012年第1期79-89,共11页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金(10CGL063);国家自然科学基金(70971012);湖南省自然科学基金(10JJ4049)资助课题

摘　　要：准确分析企业投融资之间的互动关系,实现两种决策的协同,有助于提高企业决策效率和项目价值.通过把项目融资政策内生到投资决策的实物期权模型中,构建基于股东价值最大化和企业价值最大化的投融资决策互动模型,得到两种情形下的投融资决策临界点和期权价值,并借助数值分析负债代理冲突对企业投融资行为的影响.研究结果表明,负债融资既可能引发过度投资问题,也可能抑制投资.这种非效率投资将相应地提高负债融资的成本,对企业的负债融资产生抑制作用.The correct analysis on interactive relationship between investment and fi- nancing in corporations and the cooperation of two decisions can contribute to improve deci- sion efficiency and project value for the corporations. We get the thresholds of investment and financing decision and option value through incorporating project financing decision into real options model of investment decision and establishing the interactive model of investment and financing decision based on shareholder value maximization and enterprise value maximization, and analyze the effect of agency conflict of debt on corporation investment and financing by numerical analysis. The results indicate that debt financing may cause overinvestment or un- derinvestment of shareholders. Therefore, this inefficient investment will raise the cost of debt financing accordingly, and restrain the debt financing of corporations.

关 键 词：负债融资 代理成本 非效率投资 实物期权. 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]