媒体监督公司治理的实证研究  

Empirical Study on Media as Watchdog in Corporate Governance

作　　者：醋卫华[1] 李培功[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2012年第1期33-42,共10页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70632001);福建省社科规划项目(2009C018)资助

摘　　要：随着国内改革环境的逐步宽松和市场竞争的加剧,为了赢得社会声誉和获得商业利益,媒体有动力去监督公司中存在的治理问题。在本文所选取的96个研究样本中,60.42%存在公司治理问题的企业都在证监会正式介入调查前受到过媒体的质疑和负面报道,说明媒体并非事前"缄默无语"、事后"言辞铿锵",而是积极地扮演了资本市场监督者的角色;基于成本与收益的权衡考虑,媒体会选择性质严重和涉及金额大的公司治理问题进行负面报道。本文的研究结论一方面为媒体在转型经济国家发挥公司治理监督者的作用提供了证据,另一方面也分析了在法律制度和市场化尚不完善的情况下,影响媒体发挥监督作用的因素,依此提出了若干政策建议。The intervention of Chinese governments at all levels undoubtedly blocks,on a large extent,the corporate governance role of Chinese national and local media.However,the increasing competition for advertizing revenues and circulation as well as the sheer cut of government fund force Chinese media to respond more actively without touching the bottom line which government set.Using a unique sample,we find that,among all 96 sanctioned listed companies by the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC),60.42% of which are challenged by various media before the investigation of the CSRC.In a comparable research,Miller(2006) documents a count-part ratio of only 28.5% in the United States.This evidence indicates that the Chinese media fulfills an active 'watchdog' role in monitoring corporate governance violation and protecting minority shareholders.Descriptive results show that negative reports by media invoke significant market reaction,mean abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return is-0.83%(t=-2.076) and-3.19%(t=-2.447) respectively.However,given the rapid expansion of media industry and the fuzzy boundary between national and local media and the ambiguity of the ownership of media groups,there is no evidence suggests that national and businessoriented media play a more active role than the local and politically oriented media in China.Our conclusions also suggest that negative media coverage is driven by the severity of violation,proxied by the amount of money and number of top management involved.Besides that,the numbers of shareholders increase the probability of negative reports by media,which means that media prefer to pay more attention on bigger companies in order to meet the need of information from investors.And political connection of firms decrease the probability of negative reports by media,which fundamentally manifests that central and local government also keep so considerable influence on media.Disagreement with Chen(2006),Wu and Jiang(2006),our evidence displays that institutional investor doesn

关 键 词：媒体 监督者 负面报道 

分 类 号：G206[文化科学—传播学] F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]