基于踏板时间的智猪博弈吃食量与Nash均衡集合研究  

Sets of Nash Equilibrium in Games of Boxed Pigs with Food Intake Related to Pedaling Time

作　　者：蒋梦晴[1,2] 姜殿玉[3] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116 [2]淮海工学院商学院,江苏连云港222005 [3]淮海工学院对策论及其应用研究所,江苏连云港222005

出　　处：《淮海工学院学报（自然科学版）》2012年第1期1-6,共6页Journal of Huaihai Institute of Technology:Natural Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871051)

摘　　要：智猪博弈是博弈论的经典模型,有鲜明的代表性和广泛的应用性.为了使该模型更具有现实指导意义,将近期类似的工作做了进一步研究,通过引进踩踏板单位时间的出食量e和单位时间的付出成本c两个新指标,计算大猪在不同情况下的吃食量,讨论该模型中纯Nash均衡和混合Nash均衡的存在情况,并说明了该模型在企业管理中有关激励机制制定与控制的实际意义.Boxed pigs are a classic model in game theory with wide applications.To increase the guiding significance to realistic cases,the model is further studied in term of the recent literatures.The two new indices are introduced,i.e.,food outtake e and cost c in unit time.To calculate the big pig’s food intake in different conditions,the existence of pure Nash equilibrium and completely mixed Nash equilibrium are discussed.Finally the real significance of the model with respect to the designing and controlling incentives in enterprise is shown.

关 键 词：智猪博弈 踏板时间 吃食量 NASH均衡 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]