产权性质、独立董事机制与投资效率——来自中国A股非金融类上市公司的经验证据  

Ownership Nature,Independent Director Mechanism and Investment Efficiency: Empirical Evidence from China′s Non-financial A-share Listed Companies

作　　者：程柯[1] 陈志斌[2] 赵卫斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,南京210093 [2]东南大学经济管理学院,南京210096

出　　处：《技术经济》2012年第3期103-109,共7页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"现金流价值创造与风险显现嬗变机理研究"(70972039);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"新经济时代企业价值创造模式创新及其评估研究"(08JA630036);教育部应急课题"企业现金流断流风险:金融危机对企业的正面冲击点解析与应对策略探"(2009JYJR019);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"中国企业情境下团队沟通与组织绩效关系研究"(10YJC630029)

摘　　要：选取我国沪深两市2006—2010年非金融类上市公司为研究样本,从独立董事职能的角度,结合产权性质,考察了独立董事机制对投资效率的影响。经验证据表明:独立董事比例的提高整体上可明显改善投资效率;相比国有上市公司,提高民营上市公司的独立董事比例能够更显著地改善投资效率;提高独立董事薪酬水平对改善投资效率的作用并不显著;将投资非效率区分为投资不足和投资过度两种情形后,以上结论依然成立。Taking into consideration of property right, this paper selects non-financial firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the sample,and uses the panel data from 2006 to 2010 to analyze the effects of independent director mechanism on investment efficiency from the perspective of independent director＇s function. The empirical evidence shows as follows：the increase of proportion of independent directors at board prompts the improvement of investment efficiency; this improvement in private companies is more significant than that in state owned enterprises; the compensation level of independent director has little influence on improving investment efficiency;after dividing investment inefficiency into under-investment and over-investment,the above conclusions are still robust.

关 键 词：独立董事机制 投资效率 产权性质 公司治理 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]