政府官员类政治联系、参政议政与盈余管理  

Government Officials Type Political Connections,Participation in Political Affairs and Earnings Management

作　　者：杜兴强[1] 周泽将[2] 杜颖洁[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005 [2]安徽大学管理学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《上海立信会计学院学报》2012年第1期15-23,共9页Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71072053);福建省社会科学规划重点项目(2010A012);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2010221021)

摘　　要：手工搜集了2004年-2008年民营上市公司的关键高管(董事长和总经理)的政府官员类政治联系和参政议政的相关经验数据,实证研究了政府官员类政治联系和参政议政对盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明,政府官员类政治联系和参政议政对民营上市公司盈余管理行为的影响具有"不对称性":民营上市公司的盈余管理行为与关键高管的政府官员类政治联系边际显著负相关,而民营上市公司的盈余管理行为与关键高管的参政议政显著正相关。Based on manually collected data of government officials type political connections and participation in political affairs of top management including chairman and general manager in privately listed companies, the paper empirically studies the relation between earnings management and government officials type political connections and participation in political affairs. The results show that the two types of political connections have asymmetric influence on earnings management. There is a marginally significantly negative relation between earnings management and government officials type political connections of top management in privately listed companies, but participation in political affairs causes a significantly positive effect on earnings management.

关 键 词：政府官员类政治联系 参政议政 盈余管理 不对称性 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]