信息非对称、稳健会计信息与业绩预测——基于薪酬契约动机的信号传递  

Information Asymmetry,Accounting Conservatism and Performance Predictability——The Signal Sending based on the Contract Incentive

作　　者：顾鸣润[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]昆明理工大学管理与经济学院,昆明650093 [2]云南财经大学会计学院,昆明650221

出　　处：《经济问题》2012年第4期113-117,共5页On Economic Problems

基　　金：云南财经大学"人才引进"科学研究项目"并购重组上市公司的公司治理问题研究"

摘　　要：基于管理者薪酬契约理论,从信号传递角度解释了实务中长期存在的会计稳健原则在降低信息非对称程度和发挥会计信息估值功能方面的作用。以我国1999～2010年上市公司为研究样本,研究表明公司前一年度会计信息稳健程度与当年的净资产收益率显著正相关,即支持了会计稳健程度的信号传递作用;公司综合治理水平越好,其会计稳健程度关于预期盈利的信号作用越强。Based on the contract theory,this paper explains the role played by the conservatism principle in accounting practice to predict firm＇s future performance and reduce information asymmetry.This research conducted by using the Chinese capital market data range from 1999~2010,and find that the magnitude of conservatism of last year＇s is positively significant correlated with the ROA.This finding is consistent with hypothesis which predict the magnitude of accounting conservatism can act as signal sending;this paper also find that the effectiveness of corporate governance may enforce the signal sending role played by the conservative accounting information.

关 键 词：稳健会计信息 业绩 预测 信号传递 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]