我国食品安全规制的制度性缺陷及其治理——基于新制度经济学的理论解析与政策建议  

The Institutional Governance and Drawback of Food Safety Regulation in China——Theoretical analysis and policy suggestion based on new institution economics

作　　者：陈建勋[1] 武治印[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学经济学院,北京100871

出　　处：《江苏商论》2012年第3期3-5,共3页Jiangsu Commercial Forum

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金资助项目(项目号:20110490236)

摘　　要：食品安全问题是我国近年来社会非常关注的民生问题之一,为何《食品安全法》通过之后,我国的食品安全问题仍然没有得到根本性的治理?本文基于新制度经济学的研究视角,发现我国当前的食品安全监管体制存在制度性障碍,无法从制度上保证食品链条的真正安全。基于此,本文建议今后应该继续改革当前分段监管的体制,降低食品从"农田到餐桌"全过程环节中的信息不对称,提高厂商的机会主义成本。同时应该积极建设和完善食品召回制度,强化监管部门的问责制,将监管部门与厂商的风险与责任有机捆绑,从制度上降低食品安全发生的概率。Food safety problem is one of the touchiest problems in China in recent years,however,with the food safety law published,why the food safety problem still did not get governed fundamentally？ By drawing on neo-institution economics,the paper found that Chinese food safety regulation mechanism were born of institutional drawback,because of that,it is hard to guarantee the food safety in China.Based on that,the paper suggests that in the future,China still need to reform the regulation mechanism,reduce the information asymmetry in the overall process,enhance the opportunism cost of the producers.However,when the food safety incidents happened,China still need to establish and improve the food recall institution,help the regulative divisions to build the responsibility institution,then share the duties of regulative divisions and producers,reduce the possibility of food safety problem.

关 键 词：食品 安全规制 治理 新制度经济学 交易成本 

分 类 号：F719.3[经济管理—产业经济]