基于信用的重复博弈模型在节点转发中的应用  

Credit-based repeated game model applied in transfer decision of opportunistic network

作　　者：张程[1] 刘慧君[1] 陈自郁[1] 朱庆生[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学计算机学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《解放军理工大学学报（自然科学版）》2012年第2期152-158,共7页Journal of PLA University of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家科技攻关计划重点资助项目(2007BAH08B04);重庆市自然科学基金资助项目(CSTC2006BB2229)

摘　　要：机会网络信息转发决策中,由于节点的自私性可能出现通过欺诈表现而故意导致转发决策失败的问题,并由此带来损益表的明显变化。针对这一现象,提出了基于信用合作和重复博弈的欺诈行为解决方案。在引入信用合作机制的基础上,将单次阶段博弈行为转变为其生命周期和全局网络内的重复博弈过程。通过惩罚机制和信用机制,将欺诈节点单次欺诈行为收益与惩罚周期的巨大损失相比较,迫使博弈节点在博弈过程中仔细权衡其欺诈行为可能带来的损益比,从而减少欺诈行为的可能,提高机会网络中信息转发过程的成功率。仿真实验结果表明,该方法可显著提高节点博弈过程中的诚信度和合作率。To reduce the cheating behavior of the nodes in data transfer,the idea of credit-cooperation and repeated games were involved.For a node,every game was considered as a part of the repeated game in its lifecycle.If it did a cheating operation in a game,it would face the punishment with long time.And the profit gained from the cheating-operation would be counteracted mutually from the loss of punishment time.Moreover,usually the punishment was bigger than the profits in fact.Such method minimizes the probability of cheating that happens in the game theory and improves the success-ratio of data transmission.The result shows the method is helpful to improve the honesty and cooperation of the nodes in the game.

关 键 词：博弈论 机会网络 转发决策 信用合作 

分 类 号：TP312[自动化与计算机技术—计算机软件与理论] TN929.5[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]