企业产权、财务重述与审计师变更——来自我国上市公司的经验证据  

Corporate Property Rights,Accounting Restatements and Auditor Switching:Evidence from Listed Companies in China

作　　者：张敏[1] 张卓然[1] 张雯[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《财经研究》2012年第5期134-143,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：中国人民大学科学研究基金项目(批准号:11XNJ006)资助

摘　　要：文章运用我国上市公司的数据,实证检验了上市公司的财务重述行为对审计师变更的影响。研究结果表明,对于国有企业来说,重述公司的审计师发生变更的概率要低于非重述公司,但如果重述公司上期被出具了标准无保留意见,审计师变更的概率会上升;在非国有企业中,未发现重述与审计师变更之间存在显著相关关系。对国有企业来说,财务重述与审计师变更类型之间无显著关系;在非国有企业,有微弱的证据表明,财务重述公司更容易将事务所变更为小所,如果上期被出具了标准无保留意见,这种倾向更明显。研究结果表明,上市公司和审计师之间存在"审计合谋",这一问题在国有企业中更为严重。Using the data of listed companies in China,this paper empirically tests the effect of accounting restatements on auditor switching.The results are as follows： firstly,the occurrence probability of auditor switching in restated stated-owned companies is lower than the one in non-restated stated-owned companies,and if restated companies are issued with standard unqualified opinions in the previous accounting year,the occurrence probability of auditor switching will increase;secondly,it does not show evidence of the significant relationship between accounting restatements and auditor switching in non-stated-owned companies,and the significant relationship between accounting restatements and auditor switching types in stated-owned companies;thirdly,weak evidence shows that restated non-stated-owned companies are apt to switch accounting firms to small accounting firms,and their tendencies are more obvious if they are issued with standard unqualified opinions.It confirms the audit collusion between listed companies and auditors,which is more serious in state-owned companies.

关 键 词：企业产权 财务重述 审计师变更 审计合谋 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F239[经济管理—国民经济]