回收商竞争环境下逆向供应链协调的激励机制设计  

The Design of Incentive Mechanisms for the Reverse Supply Chain Coordination Based on Collection Competition

作　　者：王文宾[1] 达庆利[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学,徐州221116 [2]东南大学,南京211189

出　　处：《工业技术经济》2012年第4期82-88,共7页Journal of Industrial Technological Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目编号:71102164);国家自然科学基金面上项目(项目编号:70971022);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(项目编号:10YJC630249);中国博士后科学基金项目(项目编号:20110491478);江苏省博士后基金项目(项目编号:1002073C)

摘　　要：由于回收努力程度难以用契约量化,本文利用委托代理理论研究了回收商竞争努力程度情况下逆向供应链的激励机制设计问题。分别讨论了信息对称与信息不对称情形的逆向供应链激励机制设计方法,并比较了两种情形下激励机制的不同。结果表明,信息不对称情形下回收商不但获得固定收入,而且在获得收益提成的同时承担一定风险;两种情形下回收商的期望效用均为其保留收入水平,而信息不对称情形下制造商的效用降低;制造商设计激励机制时要考虑代理成本的影响因素并做代理成本与监督成本的权衡;回收商竞争程度的增加导致回收商努力程度提高,而制造商期望效用增加,代理成本减少;制造商希望回收商回收难度大;适当的竞争对回收商有利等。This paper studies the design of incentive mechanisms with collection effort competition applying the principal-agent theory for the reason of the difficulty about contracting the collection effort.The differences of incentive mechanism with information symmetry and asymmetry are discussed and compared respectively.The results show that the collector not only gains the fixed income but also gains the risk compensation and bears the same proportion of the risk with information asymmetry;however,the collector only gains the fixed income with information symmetry.Secondly,the collector＇s expected benefit is same in both cases;in contrast,the manufacturer＇s expected benefit is lower with information asymmetry.Thirdly,the manufacturer should pay attention to the agent cost＇s influence factors and should balance the agent cost and the supervising cost.The collection effort and the manufacturer＇s expected benefit increase while the agent cost decreases with the increase of competition degree.The manufacturer prefers a hard collection effort of the collectors.The collector is benefited from an appropriate competition degree etc.

关 键 词：逆向供应链 回收努力 激励机制 风险 委托代理 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济]