力量不对等供应链下游寡头行为演化机理  

Evolutionary Mechanism of Downstream Duopoly's Behavior on Supply Chain with Unbalanced Bargaining Power

作　　者：韩敬稳[1] 赵道致[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072

出　　处：《北京理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2012年第2期51-57,共7页Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology：Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771073;70771071;71002007;71172018);教育部新世纪优秀人才基金资助项目(NCET-07-0595);天津市高等学校科技发展基金计划项目(20102127)

摘　　要：以常见的垄断竞争的供应商和寡头竞争的强势零售商组成的供应链为研究对象,应用演化博弈论中双种群演化模型探讨供应商讨价还价能力对强势零售商使用买方势力行为的影响,得到强势零售商对供应商交易行为的演化稳定策略(ESS)。研究表明,供应商的讨价还价能力和零售商转嫁成本策略导致的交易成本和风险成本是影响ESS的重要因素,供应商较高的讨价还价能力及转嫁成本策略导致的较高的交易成本和风险成本,将有助于消除零售商滥用买方势力的行为。Taking the supply chain consisting of many monopolistic competitive suppliers and two oligarch competitive retailers as the research object,we investigate how suppliers＇bargaining power affect stronger retailer＇s buyer power abuse and get the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of retailer＇s transaction behavior to suppliers through the double groups＇evolutionary model of Evolutionary game theory. The results show that suppliers＇stronger bargaining power and the higher transaction and risk cost which are induced by the strategy of retailer＇s transferring cost to suppliers can help to eliminate retailer＇s buyer power abuse.

关 键 词：力量不对等供应链 演化博弈 演化稳定策略(ESS) 

分 类 号：F713.54[经济管理—市场营销]