大学技术创业主体特征与收益分配机制分析  

Study on Subjective Features and Profits Distribution Mechanism of University Technology Entrepreneurship

作　　者：曹兴[1,2] 陈鑫臻[3] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院 [2]湖南工业大学商学院 [3]中南大学

出　　处：《科学决策》2012年第4期12-22,共11页Scientific Decision Making

基　　金：教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(编号:NCET-07-0857);教育部博士点基金项目(编号:20090162110064);中央高校基本科研业务费课题

摘　　要：大学技术创业活动涉及到大学科研人员、大学和企业投资者等相关主体,收益分配是推进大学技术创业活动顺利开展的关键。在分析大学技术创业相关主体特征的基础上,研究了大学技术创业的收益分配运行机制,接着引入Nash谈判模型,对收益分配谈判过程及最优谈判结果的实现条件做了进一步研究。结果表明:大学技术创业收益在各主体之间的分配主要与各主体相对的谈判力以及对谈判破裂的担心程度有关,谈判力越强,对谈判破裂的担心程度越小,其收益越多。在大学技术创业中,科研人员处于主导地位,谈判力最强,因此其收益也应最多;当收益主体对谈判破裂的担心程度与自身谈判力的相对值相同时,各方实现各自收益的最大化。The main subjects in the university technology entrepreneurial activities include scientific researchers, universities and investors. Profits distribution is the key to promote the university entrepreneurial activities to develop smoothly. The operating mechanism of university entrepre- neurship is researched based on the features of the main subjects in the university technology en- trepreneurial activities. And then, the paper uses Nash negotiation model to analysis the negotia-tion process and the condition to realize the optimal results. Our conclusion is that： the profits of the main subjects are related to their negotiating powers and the degrees of worrying about nego- tiate broking down. The more power and less worry they have, the more profits they can a- chieve. The negotiating power of scientific researchers who are in the leading position is the lar- gest in university technology entrepreneurship, so they should achieve the most profits. All the subjects can achieve maximun profits when the relative value of worrying and negotiating power is the same.

关 键 词：技术创业 收益分配 NASH谈判模型 

分 类 号：G472.5[文化科学—教育学]