科技型中小企业间接融资市场主体行为的动态博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Market Players' Behavior in the Loan Fund Market for Science & Technology SME

作　　者：余可[1] 卢金贵[2] 

机构地区：[1]广东商学院财税学院,广东广州510320 [2]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510320

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2012年第9期218-222,共5页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：广东省科技厅课题"广东省财政畜牧农业科技投入促进农民收入增长的长效机制研究"(00442612200220013);广东省科技厅课题"促进广东省科技服务业发展的财税激励机制和政策研究"(2010A040103005)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：通过构建以中小企业借款人、银行、政府和担保机构为市场主体的动态博弈模型,对各博弈主体在信贷市场上的子博弈精炼均衡下的最优行为选择进行分析,讨论要实现这一均衡所需要达到的条件,得出政府的科技投入在金融与科技结合的微观机制中起极其关键的作用的结论。This article analysis the market players＇ optimal behavior under the sub - game perfect equilibrium in credit market, and discusses the conditions which need to be reached to achieve this equilibriu by building the dynamic fourplayer game model whose market players include science ＆ technology SME borrowers, banks, government and security agencies, the result showns that the government science and technology investment plays a crucial role in the micro - financing mechanisms for small and medium enterprises.

关 键 词：间接融资 科技型中小企业 动态博弈分析 市场主体 

分 类 号：F276.3[经济管理—企业管理] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]