控制权稀释威胁影响上市公司并购支付方式选择吗  

Does Control Right Dilution Affect the Choice of Payment in M&A of Listed Companies?

作　　者：李双燕[1] 汪晓宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2012年第3期58-66,126,共9页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：陕西省社会科学基金(11E152);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金;国家自然科学基金(71102095)项目资助

摘　　要：当现金并购支付方式优先于股票被大量采用时,以往研究认为这源于主并方控股股东避免控制权稀释导致控制权私利受损的动机,忽视了并购发生时和并购后有持续攫取控制权私利的潜在需要。本文构建了一个基于控制权私利动态性的并购支付方式选择的理论框架。对2004-2007年上市公司774个并购事件的实证分析表明,并购支付决策是控股股东在控制权稀释威胁、债务融资约束及预期并购后所面临的监督之间权衡的结果,前者促进了现金支付偏好,而后两者均减低了该偏好。所隐含的政策启示是,上市公司并购支付方式创新本质上要与抑制控制权私利活动结合起来。With cash as priority to stock in merger and acquisition(M&A) payment,previous studies hold that this is due to the motive that the controlling acquirer shareholder avoids controlling right dilution rather.This paper constructs a theoretical framework considering the dynamics of extracting private benefits with 774 M&A samples from Chinese listed companies through 2004-2007.The results show that a tradeoff between the threat of control right dilution,the constraint of debt financing and the anticipated monitor in post-M&A is found to have a large bearing on the bidder's payment choice.The former promotes the use of cash while the latter has a negative impact on it.This implies that the innovation of payment method in M&A should be inherently incorporated with restraining private benefits of control right.

关 键 词：控制权稀释威胁 控制权私利 并购支付方式 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济] F224