品类管理引致的瓶颈垄断及反垄断规制取向  

On the Bottleneck Monopoly Caused by the Category Management and the Orientation of Antitrust Regulation

作　　者：赵玻[1] 严晗[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江外国语学院国际工商管理学院,浙江杭州310012 [2]安徽财经大学国际经济贸易学院,安徽蚌埠233041

出　　处：《浙江外国语学院学报》2012年第1期72-76,93,共6页Journal of Zhejiang International Studies University

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(11YJC790291)

摘　　要：品类管理作为提高店铺商品管理效率的重要形式,在发达国家零售企业得到广泛应用。然而,品类管理实践中,一般由行业中最大供应商担任品类经理的做法,却可能引致瓶颈垄断,对供应商与消费者造成损害。因此,应在认定担任品类经理的特定供应商是否拒绝与水平竞争者交易、是否具有显著市场势力的基础上,依据"一事一议"的原则,对品类管理进行反垄断规制。As an important means of improving the commodity management efficiency in the stores, the category management is widely used by large retailers in the developed countries. However, the common practice of the largest suppliers acting as category managers may cause the bottleneck monopoly and do damage to consumers and other suppliers. Therefore, if the category captain has market power and refuses to deal with competitors, the category management should be regulated in accordance with the antitrust laws on the basis of case by case.

关 键 词：品类管理 瓶颈垄断 反垄断规制取向 

分 类 号：F062.1[经济管理—政治经济学]