政府干预、终极控制人变更与并购价值效应评价  

Government Control,Change of Ultimate Control Person and the Estimation of M&A Value Effect

作　　者：田满文[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏师范大学经济学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2012年第6期18-25,共8页Finance & Economics

摘　　要：转轨时期政府干预是并购效率的关键影响因素之一,目前这方面的研究还非常不够。本文从政府干预的行政层次、国有控制权转移及终极控制人变更等多维角度,深入剖析政府干预对并购效率的影响。研究发现:并购市场的资源配置效率稳步上升,但政府干预对公司并购产生负面影响,各级政府对公司并购的干预程度有差异导致并购效率有差异。随着政府干预从中央到省、市、县各级政府的强化,其并购效率依次递减。国有控制权转移市场受政府干预影响其并购效率不高,终极控制人变更下的国有控制权转移绩效相对较高。During the transition period government intervention is one of the key factors of M＆A efficiency. The current research in this area is still very inadequate. From the multi - dimensional angle of the administration level of government intervention, the takeovers of state- owned enterprises, Change of ultimate control and so on, this paper analyzes the influence of government intervention on the impact of M＆A efficiency deeply. It finds： the resource allocation efficiency of M＆A is rising with steady steps, but the government intervention has the negative influence to the company M＆A; All levels of the government intervention have the difference so that it causes the difference of the M＆_A efficiency. With government intervention from the central to provincial, city and county to strengthen the M＆A efficiency is decreasing, the M＆A efficiency of the state - owned domination shift is low by cause of government intervention; The state - owned domination shift achievements of the ultimate control person change are relatively high.

关 键 词：政府控制 终极控制人变更 并购效率 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F123[经济管理—国民经济] F224