我国食品安全监管体系理论探析——基于博弈理论  被引量:1

Theory Study on the System of Food Security Supervision in China——Based on Game Theory

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作  者:焦万慧[1] 

机构地区:[1]江西农业大学经济贸易学院,江西南昌330045

出  处:《科技广场》2012年第4期167-172,共6页Science Mosaic

摘  要:"国以民为本,民以食为天",食品安全事关国计民生。近期我国食品安全问题频繁发生,知名品牌卷入食品安全问题的漩涡之中。通过博弈分析,本文认为我国食品安全监管存在"激励悖论",建立和完善食品安全监管体系的三重约束和三道防线是解决我国食品安全问题的有效途径和重要手段。"The people are what matter to the nation and food is what matters to the people." Food security is related to the people's livelihood. But recently, food safety problems occur frequently in China, with some famous brands involved in the maelstrom of food safety problems. Using the game theory, this paper holds that there exists "incentive paradox" in food safety supervision in China; and that it is an effective way and important means to solve food safety problems by establishing and perfecting the triple constraints and three defensive lines in the food safety regulatory system in China.

关 键 词:食品安全 博弈模型 激励悖论 

分 类 号:F224[经济管理—国民经济]

 

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