集体声誉下最低质量标准的福利效应  

The Welfare Effect of Minimum Quality Standard under Collective Reputation

作　　者：陈艳莹[1] 杨文璐[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学经济学院

出　　处：《南开经济研究》2012年第1期134-144,共11页Nankai Economic Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"规范发展市场中介组织的政策创新:嵌入性视角的研究"(08BJY120);霍英东教育基金会资助项目"社会网络约束下的市场中介组织行为异化及其治理研究"(121081);教育部新世纪人才支持项目(NCET-08-0083);中央高校基本科研业务费文科基地项目(DUT10RW103)

摘　　要：本文针对集体声誉行业的特点构建两阶段博弈模型,从竞争效应和质量效应两个方面系统考察了集体声誉下最低质量标准规制的福利效应。结果发现,最低质量标准通常具有的反竞争效应在集体声誉行业并不存在,适度并偏高的标准在提高质量水平的同时反而会增加行业当中的企业数量和改善社会福利。最后,结合我国乳品新国标的例子,对运用最低质量标准规制解决我国集体声誉行业普遍存在的质量问题提出了政策建议。This paper constructs a two-stage game according to the characteristics of collec- tive reputation industry, systematically analyzes the welfare effect of minimum quality standard regulation in the collective reputation industry from two aspects： competition ef- fect and quality effect. The results showed that, the anti-competitive effect which minimum quality standard usually has does not exist in the collective reputation industry, moderate and high standard can improve the quality, increase the number of companies in the industry, and improve social welfare. Finally, with the example of China＇s Dairy new GB, this paper gives policy suggestions on how to use minimum quality standard regulation to resolve the quality problems which are ubiquitous in China＇s collective reputation industry.

关 键 词：集体声誉 最低质量标准 社会福利 竞争效应 

分 类 号：F273.2[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]