不对称股权结构、法律保护与薪酬绩效敏感性——基于中国上市公司数据的经验研究  

Disproportional Ownership Structure,Law Protection and Pay-performance Relationship:Evidence from China's Listed Firms

作　　者：潘鹏杰[1,2] 周方召[2] 范德成[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001 [2]哈尔滨商业大学经济研究中心,黑龙江哈尔滨150028

出　　处：《预测》2012年第3期30-35,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年基金资助项目(09YJC790062)

摘　　要：基于2002～2007年沪深A股上市公司数据,本文发现最终控股股东的现金流权能够起到促进公司经理人薪酬—绩效敏感性的作用。进一步的分析表明,国有控股上市公司中现金流权对公司经理薪酬—财务绩效的影响较大;而民营上市公司中,现金流权对于公司经理薪酬—市场绩效的影响更大。此外,投资者法律保护和公司绩效交互项变量对于经理人薪酬影响是正向的,但不显著,这说明投资者法律保护对于促进经理人薪酬—绩效激励机制的作用还没有完全发挥。Based on data from 2002 to 2007 China＇ s listed firms, this paper finds that the cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder have a positive effect on this relationship, and further analysis of the results shows that cash flow rights in state owned enterprises（SOE） controlled firms has a significant impact on accounting based pay performance, however cash flow rights have a greater impact on the market performance based relationship in privately controlled firms. Furthermore, the impact of law investors protection and interactive effects to CEO pay-performance is positive but still not significant, this shows the law investors protection has not make a difference on CEO payperformance.

关 键 词：经理人薪酬绩效 控股股东 不对称股权结构 投资者法律保护 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]